What was not accepted from NGO Atina's comments -  and why this weakens the Draft Law

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In 2025, the Republic of Serbia prepared a Draft Law on the Prevention and Suppression of Human Trafficking and the Protection of Victims, as part of the Republic of Serbia Reform Agenda 2024-2027, with the expectation that the law would be adopted in 2026. NGO Atina participated in the Working Group's work and, subsequently, in the public consultation process by submitting written proposals to strengthen the text, its underlying logic, and its practical enforceability.

Below, we explain why certain recommendations were not accepted and how these omissions reduce the effectiveness of the law. What is particularly concerning is that such solutions weaken a survivor-centered approach and undermine trauma-informed and gender-sensitive practice.

First, the Draft fails to recognize new and complex forms of exploitation clearly. NGO Atina proposed explicitly including forced/exploitative/commercial surrogacy within the understanding of exploitation linked to human trafficking, but this proposal was not accepted. As a result, prevention, identification, protection, and reintegration lack operational guidance for cases that are increasingly prevalent in practice. When the law does not name a phenomenon, frontline actors are left without a clear framework for action, which increases the risk of missed identification and protection gaps.

Similarly, in the section addressing the principle of the best interests, the Draft does not explicitly recognize women and girls as survivors of this form of gender-based violence in the context of trafficking, nor does it provide specific safeguards that would ensure additional attention and trauma-informed practices guaranteeing safety, dignity, and participation. The Draft remains at a general level of formulation, while experience shows that general norms often do not ensure consistent implementation. Without explicit recognition, gender-specific risks and barriers to disclosure are more easily overlooked, and accountability for gender-responsive guarantees throughout all stages of action remains diluted.

The issue of governance and coordination further illustrates this weakness. The proposal to explicitly include ministers responsible for the economy and foreign affairs in the relevant coordination structures was not accepted. Yet labour exploitation and transnational recruitment chains require the structural involvement of labour-market actors and cross-border mechanisms. Without formal inclusion of these sectors, prevention and response can easily remain predominantly "security-oriented" and less effective in addressing labour exploitation and cross-border trafficking dynamics.

The Draft also fails to introduce clear minimum standards for training. Atina proposed that all professional development programmes include a mandatory module on digital forms of trafficking, online identification, and work with persons recruited through new technologies, but this proposal was not accepted. The consequence is uneven practice across institutions and regions, at a time when recruitment and control increasingly occur online and require specific skills, from recognizing risk indicators and understanding platforms to preserving digital evidence.

Equally problematic is that the role of specialized civil society organizations is not explicitly established as systemic, but remains potentially ad hoc. A clear legal provision guaranteeing the participation of specialized organizations in all phases (identification, protection, reintegration, prevention), and their systematic support through institutional partnerships and service standardization, was not accepted. Without explicit recognition and mandate, referrals, quality assurance, and continuity of long-term support become less predictable, especially in reintegration, where specialized CSOs often provide what institutions cannot: continuity over time.

In the area of prevention, binding provisions for proactive work with groups recognized as being at high risk of exploitation are also missing. The proposal requiring outreach and fieldwork, including work with migrants, foreign workers without regulated status, children at risk of dropping out of education and of child/early marriage, as well as groups facing multiple forms of discrimination, was not accepted. Generic references to "vulnerable groups" rarely translate in practice into targeted, resourced, and measurable programmes. Without explicit obligations, prevention remains largely informational rather than proactive and grounded in outreach.

In the same direction is the absence of cyber-prevention. A specific provision on cyber-preventive measures and public information about the risks of online recruitment (social networks, the internet, employment apps) was not accepted. The digital environment requires specialized preventive tools and strategies, but without explicit content, obligations, and resources, cyber-prevention remains vague and difficult to measure and monitor.

The Draft also fails to incorporate prevention elements within the business sector. Atina proposed a specific provision to prevent business activities and supply chains, including risk assessment, preventive and corrective measures, internal policies, reporting mechanisms, and oversight, but the proposal was not accepted. Labour exploitation is one of the main drivers of trafficking, and without a primary legal basis for prevention in supply chains, enforcement and oversight remain limited. Prevention in high-risk sectors thus remains structurally weak, despite clear European trends in human rights due diligence.

Particularly serious consequences arise from omissions related to victims' rights "in practice." The Draft does not explicitly state that the right to information includes referral to specialized organizations' services, nor was the same amendment accepted in relation to Article 27. It also does not provide an explicit guarantee of the right to choose among different service providers, including licensed specialized CSOs with long-standing experience. In reality, victims often first turn to specialized CSOs and may not trust institutions. Without explicit referral and choice of provider, access can narrow, become uneven, and depend on discretionary practice, directly undermining safety, trust, and continuity of support.

Likewise, within the free legal aid ecosystem, CSOs' operational role in access to legal aid is not recognized. Provisions enabling specialized organizations to inform and refer to legal aid, and enabling lawyers engaged through CSOs to be integrated into the free legal aid system, were not accepted. Barriers to legal aid are often procedural and time-sensitive. Without a clear operational role for specialized CSOs, often the first point of contact in practice, victims may face delays, miss deadlines, and experience unequal access, especially foreign nationals and persons facing language barriers or trauma-related difficulties in disclosing facts.

In the reintegration section, the Draft further weakens what has proven essential: labour inclusion and long-term support. The proposal to explicitly recognize and support proven models of labour inclusion implemented by specialized CSOs and social enterprises, through public policies, subsidies, and partnerships, was not accepted. General obligations do not ensure continuity of models that provide safe workplaces and trauma-sensitive pathways to empowerment. Without explicit recognition, these models remain vulnerable to unstable funding and are not embedded in systematic reintegration planning.

In addition, in the area of accommodation and long-term support, the provision (within a partially accepted proposal) recognizing the "key role" of specialized organizations in ensuring long-term and individualized support was not accepted. Sustainable reintegration depends precisely on continuity and individualized support over time. Without explicit recognition of specialized providers, long-term support may remain limited to what is institutionally available rather than what victims genuinely need.

Finally, one of the most critical omitted safeguards concerns the intersection with the asylum system. A protective provision that would postpone the enforcement of a negative asylum decision until the completion of the formal identification procedure, where a person is undergoing identification as a presumed victim of trafficking, was not accepted. Without explicit procedural guarantees, victims may be removed before identification is completed, undermining access to protection, assistance, and recovery. This is particularly critical for vulnerable persons with limited legal support, language barriers, or trauma-related difficulties in presenting facts.

All of the above points to the same conclusion: when a law relies on general formulations without clear obligations, standards, and accountability, it becomes weaker precisely where it must be strongest, in practice, at the first point of contact, in continuity of support, and in the real possibility for survivors to access the protection they need. That is why we insist that a survivor-centered, trauma-informed, and gender-responsive approach must not be treated as an "add-on," but as the core logic of the law.